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The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986: Who is "Known to the Government?" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s, the United States witnessed several alarming events which 
questioned the strength of U.S. immigration policies.! For example, the hostage 
taking at the U.S. embassy in Tehran created status questions concerning the 
tens of thousands of Iranian students in the United States." Also, the Haitian 
"boat people" who arrived after escaping from the Duvalier regime and the one 
hundred thousand Cubans who arrived via the "Mariel Boatlift" required the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deal with masses of undocu-
mented aliens." In 1980 it was estimated that between 3.5 and IO million illegal 
aliens were present in the United States.' The INS's inability to control illegal 
border entry and interior immigration problems has been the result of many 
years of inadequate funding and overwhelming demand for immigration ser-
vices.' 
On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)!; which amended the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act (lNA).7 Among other things, IRCA adopted a broad legalization 
program which gave legal status to all aliens who were able to prove continuous 
illegal residence in the United States since January I, \982." As with any amor-
phous law reform, IRCA contains several areas of controversy. 
One controversial issue concerns a restrictive interpretation of the legalization 
procedure and its effect on a particular group of aliens, namely, nonimmi-
grants." A nonimmigrant is generally defined as an individual who wishes to 
I Sf£' Leiden, The ImmigratiON Rlj()l7n (lnd (;ontnd Art of 1986: IntrodurtioN and LegL,lativ(' 01!l'rVleW, in 
Tm, NEW S'MPSON ROD]"O IMMI(;RAT!O" LAW Of Il)Hfl. at 4 (Mailman ed. 1'187). 
, Id. 
·'Id. 
IN. MONTWIELEK, THE Jr...lMl(;R.ATION REFORM LA\\, OF 1986: ANALYSIS, TEXT, ANt) LEGISLATIVE 
llISTORY 54 (1987). 
i Leiclen, .wjJm 110tt' I, at 3. 
Ii Immigration Reform and Control Act of I'lH(). Pub. L No. l)l)·()O'I. 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 L·.S.c:. (Supp. 1'186» [hereinafter IRCAJ, 
71mmigratioll and ]\;ationality Art. H L.S.C. * 1101 et s<'4. (ll)H2) [hereinafter INA]; sef IRCA 
Preamble. 100 Stat. at 335'). 
'H USc. * 1255a 
" See. ('.g .. ',2 Fed. Reg. /(i.20(i (19H7). 
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visit the United States for a temporary stay but also has a residence in a foreign 
country which he or she does not plan to abandon. lo As written, IRCA requires 
non immigrants to prove that their illegal status was "known to the Government" 
prior to January 1, 1982.11 As interpreted in the regulations created by the INS, 
"known to the Government" means "known to the INS."12 
This Comment analvzes the INS interpretation of "known to the Govern-
ment" in light of the generous intent of Congress in creating the legalization 
program.l:l This Comment also attempts to find a reasonable interpretation of 
the phrase. The Comment first gives a background and history of the law and 
specifically the "known to the Government" issue. I I Second, this Comment 
analyzes the application of the rule of deference in this situation. I' Third, this 
Comment looks to recent case law interpreting "known to the Government" and 
the INS's response to the court decisions. lti Fourth, this Comment makes an 
analysis of the phrase using traditional rules of statutory interpretation. 17 Fi-
nally, the Comment considers the various policy considerations of a narrow and 
broad interpretation. I" 
II. BACKGROUKD 
A. GP1ll'rai His/of)' 
In 1978 the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Com-
mission) was created for the purpose of studying U.S. immigration and refugee 
laws and policy.I'l After two years of study, the Commission reported a need for 
immediate action in revamping immigration laws in order to curb illegal im-
migration. 20 \\'hile the Commission recognized the national importance of con-
tinuing legal immigration, the Commission believed that U.S. immigration law 
IIIS,yH l'.S.C.A. * IIOl(a)(15) (19Hi). 
II H l·.S.C. * 12r,:;a(a)(2)(B). 
12 "2 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,20H (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. * 24:'a). 
I \ .'In' In/IO notes I YR-217 and accompanying text. 
1 t S('(' il!/m notes J9-S'1 and accompanying text. 
1-, ,)'ee inFra notes 6B-H6 and accompanying text. 
IIi Sf{' wjw notes H7-156 and accompanying text. 
17 Sa Ifl/W lIotes 1?J7-217 and accOIllpanying text. 
lK Sec inlm notes 21H--1A and accompanying text. 
I~J Pub. L. ~o. 95-412. 92 Stat. 90i (197H). The committee consisted of sixteen members whose task 
was to "study and evaluate existing laws. policies, and procedures governing the admission of immi-
grants and refugees to the United States and to make such administrative and legislative recommen-
dations to the Pr('~idellt and to the Congress as are appropriate." Iff. at § 4(c), 9:! Stat. at 9UH. 
'" S. REI'. :-.10. 132, 99tfi Cong., 1st S{"5S. 22 (1985) [hereinafter S. REI'. :-.In. 132]. Res{"arcfi included 
social sciellce and legal research studies, twelve regional public hearings, visits around the nation, as 
well as consultations with go\crnmcnt and civilian experts, scholars, representatives from state and 
local governmcllts, cthnic organization.." ellyironmental and population groups, illternational organi-
zation~, church organi/atiolls, ci\'il liherties groups, organiJ:ed labor, employers' associations and im-
migration l;!wyers. I". 
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should impose sanctions on employers who "knowingly hire" illegal aliens. 21 
The Commission's study found pre-IRCA immigration laws to be contradictory 
because an employer's action in hiring an alien was not illegal, even though the 
alien's presence in the United States was illegal and punishable by deportation.22 
An employer faced no sanctions for hiring aliens. 23 These aliens were often 
willing to work for lower wages than U.S. workers24 because the job opportu-
nities in the United States offered higher wages and better working conditions 
than the aliens could find in their home countries.25 Over time, illegal aliens 
have become an exploitable subclass in our society.26 Their eagerness to find 
employment, their vulnerability to deportation, and the relatively lower working 
conditions of their home countries have put these people at the mercy of U.S. 
employers.27 
The Commission's recommendations for alleviating the problems of illegal 
immigration centered around three primary areas: (I) employer sanctions for 
hiring illegal aliens,2M (2) a legalization program for those aliens who have 
become an integral part of U.S. society, and (3) improvement of the temporary 
worker program by controlling the supply of workers and thereby lessening the 
burden of immigration reform on American industries.29 These issues became 
the basis of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.30 
21Id. at 22-23; H.R. REP. No. 682. 99th Cong .• 2d Sess. at 53. reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5649 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 682]; Leiden, supra note I, at 5. For an explanation of 
the "knowingly hire" requirement, see infra note 37. 
22 Mailman, 1986 Immigmtion Legislation Introduction and Sun''.v, in THE NEW SIMPSON RODINO IM-
MIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 13 (Mailman ed. 1987). 
23 H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 47 (quoting Althea Simmons, Director, Washington Bureau, 
NAACP). 
24Id. 
25 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 8; Leiden, supra note I, at 5. 
26 S. REP. No. 132. supra note 20, at 108 (minority view of Sen. Simon). As stated by a representative 
of the NAACP to the Immigration Subcommittee on September 9, 1985, "[t]he [illegal alien] worker 
is consciously aware that he/she has no protection because of illegal status and will accept 'starvation' 
wages to be employed in the United States." H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 47. 
27 See H.R. REP. No. 682, supm note 21. at 49; S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 8, 108. 
" The schedule of penalties is as follows: First offense-civil fine of $250 to $2,000 for each alien 
involved; second offense-civil fine of $2,000 to $5,000 for each alien involved; third offense-civil 
fine of $3.000 to $10,000 for each alien involved; pattern or practice of violations-criminal penalties 
of up to six months imprisonment and/or $3.000 fine; recordkeeping violations-civil fines of $100 to 
$1,000 for each individual for which the employer has failed to keep records. 8 U.s.C. §§ I 324a(e)(4), 
(e)(5). (f)(l) (Supp. 1986). 
2. S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 22. 
:,., See IRCA, supra note 6. 
As long as greater job opportunities are available to foreign nationals who succeed in physically 
entering this country, intense illegal immigration pressure on the United States will continue. 
This pressure will decline only if the availability of U.S. employment is eliminated, or the 
disparity in wages and working conditions is reduced, through improvement in the Third 
World or deterioration in the United States. 
S. REP. No. 132. supra note 20, at 8. 
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B. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
On March 17, 1982 Senator Simpson submitted the original IRCA bill to 
Congress.:ll Although it was passed by the Senate, the House of Representatives 
vigorously debated the bill on the House floor on December 16, 17, and 18, 
1982 but never brought the bill to a vote. 32 In June 1984, the House approved 
its version of the bill and a joint conference committee met for ten days to 
resolve the remaining differences between the House and Senate bills.:l3 In the 
98th congressional term, however, Congress reached no final resolution.34 In 
the following year, a Conference Committee debated the bill, and produced a 
Conference Report which was finally passed by the House on October 15, 1986 
and by the Senate on October 17, 1986.35 
IRCA is the most comprehensive immigration reform in the United States 
since 1952."" The basic provisions of the Act make it unlawful for an employer 
to hire anyone without following a screening procedure to determine the ap-
plicant's legal statusY In addition, the law provides a legalization procedure 
for any alien who can prove illegal residence in the United States since January 
1, 1982.38 Special provisions were created to provide more lenient standards 
31 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 24. 
32 Id. at 24-25; H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 55. 
33 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20. at 26; H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21. at 55. 
34 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 26; see H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 55 . 
.15 Leiden, supra note I, at II. 
56 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 18. The last revision of the INA occurred in 1952 with the 
passage of the McCarran-Walter Act. Id. The most prominent amendments to the INA suhsequent to 
the McCarren-Waiter Act occurred in 1965 and 1976, both of which dealt with reforming the system 
for admitting legal immigrants. Id. 
57 8 U.s.C. § 1324a(a), (b) (Supp. 1986) (IRCA § 101); Mailman, supra note 22, at 13. Section 1324a(b) 
sets forth verification procedures that ptovide a defense for any employer against an alleged violation 
of § 1324a(a)(1). See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 32-33, The verification procedures require an 
employer to attest, under penalty of perjury, that he or she has examined what reasonahly appears 
on its face to be either (1) a document establishing employment authorization and idenlity or (2) a 
combination of documents which establish employment authorization and identification. 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1324a(b)(1). In addition, the employee must attest to being a citizen of the United States or that he 
or she is otherwise authorized to be employed. Id. at 1324a(b)(2). 
"H U.s.c. § 1255a (Supp. 1986) (lRCA § 201). A legalization cutoff date of July I, 1968 was initially 
proposed when the legalization program was considered in the mid-1970's by the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, as well as the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization. S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, 
at 19-20. Under the Carter administration, the "Alien Adjustment and Employment Act of 1977" 
changed the cutoff dates f{JI' legalization to January I, 1970 for granting permanent resident status 
and January I, 1977 for granting a five-year temporary status, Id. at 21. Subsequently, the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Control reported its findings and recommended a legali-
zation cutoff date of January I, 1980. Id. at 22. After elaborate studies and public hearings, IRCA 
was passed on Novemher 6, 1986 with aJanuary I, 1982 cutofl date. 8 u.s.c. § 12.1)5a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 
1986). 
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for legalization of aliens employed as fannworkers,,,cl as well as Cubans and 
Haitians. "" 
Regarding the requirements to qualify for legalization, Title II of IRCA 
amends the INA by adding 8 U.S.c. § 1255a, "Temporary Resident Status.""! 
It states that the Attorney General has a duty to adjust the status of an alien to 
that of an alien lawfully admitted as a temporary resident if the alien meets 
four basic eligibility requirements: (J) timely application, (2) continuous unlaw-
ful residence since before January 1, 1982, (3) continuous physical presence 
since enactment, and (4) admissibility as an immigrant. l2 Continuous residence 
since 1982 requires a nonimmigrant alien to prove that he or she entered the 
United States and resided in an unlawful status before January J, 1982.43 The 
law provides two methods for an alien who entered the United States with a 
nonimmigrant visa to become a temporary resident. The first allows an alien to 
prove that he or she entered the United States with a valid visa before January 
1, 1982 and that the period of lawful stay expired before such date through 
the passage of time. The second method provides eligibility for legalization to 
an alien who violated his or her visa statUs even though the visa had not expired, 
as long as the alien can prove that this unlawfulness was "known to the Gov-
ernment" as of January 1, 1982.H 
As a result of IRCA's legalization provisions, approximately two million aliens 
will become eligible for temporary resident status."'> Once an alien has received 
temporary resident status, the Attorney General has a duty to adjust the status 
to that of a permanent resident when four requirements have been met: (l) 
'1" 8 e.s.c. § llliO (Supp. 1986) (lRCA § 3(2). 
"0 IRCA. supra note 6. at § 202. 
41 "Temporary Resident Status" provides privileges including legal residence, ernploymenl authori-
zation, and permission to travel abroad. Sce 8 U.S.c. § 1255a(a), (b)(3). Temporary resident status may 
be terminated if (I) it is determined that the alien was ineligible for temporary residence, (2) the alien 
commits an act which renders him or her inadmissible as an imrnigrant, (3) the alien is convicted of 
any felony, or three or more misdemeanors, or (4) the alien fails to file for an adjustment of status 
from temporary resident status to permanent resident status. Id. at 1255a(b)(2). Termination of 
temporary resident status returns the alien to unlawful status. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1987) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(u)(4)). 
42 8 U.S.c. § 1255a(a) (Supp. 1986) (lRCA § 2(1). Timely application requires filing between May 
5, 1987 and May 4, 1988.52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987). Continuous unlawful residence will be considered 
broken upon a single absence from the United States of f(lrty-five days or longer, or an aggregate of 
absences greater than 180 days between January I, 1982 and the date of filing for temporary residence. 
Id. at 16,212. Continuous physical presence will not be broken by absences that are "brief, casual and 
innocent." ld. at 16,206. To be admitted as an imilligrant, an alien must not have been convit:ted of a 
felony or three or more misdemeanors. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4). 
43 See 8 e.s.c. § 1255a(a)(2)(8) (Supp. 1986). 
HId. 
15 Drake, Zacovic, Wheeler, Poplawski, Sweeping Changes in Immigration Laws Affect Alien's Rights to 
Work and Legalize Their Status, CLEARIN(;HOUSE REV. 74 (May 1987) [hereinafter Drake]. 
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timely application after one year of temporary residence, (2) continuous resi-
dence since legal temporary residence was granted, (3) admissibility as an im-
migrant, and (4) possession of basic citizenship skills.46 Among those otherwise 
eligible for legalization, a number of aliens will be denied temporary residence 
because of a strict interpretation of the phrase "known to the Government" 
contained in the administrative regulations created by the Attorney General. 
C. Why Is "Known to the Government" Important? 
In January 1987, the Attorney General issued draft regulations for comment 
pursuant to 8 U.S.c. § 1255a(g)(l) and subsequently in March published pro-
posed regulationsY Section 1255a(g)(l) specifically allows the Attorney General 
to propose regulations (1) to define "resided continuously," (2) to describe the 
evidence needed to establish that an alien has resided continuously, and (3) to 
create implementation guidelines for legalization. Among those provisions of 
the INA added by IRCA and subject to the Attorney General's interpretation, 
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) has created a great deal of controversy.4H This section 
requires a nonimmigrant who entered the United States with a valid visa and 
subsequently violated the visa status to prove that his or her illegal status was 
"known to the Government" prior to January I, 1982 in order to be eligible for 
legalization.49 The proposed regulations define "known to the Government" as 
knowledge of unlawful status held by the INS.50 Despite the negative feedback 
from practitioners protesting such an extremely limited interpretation of the 
phrase, the Attorney General published the official regulations on May I, 1987 
without changing the original interpretation.5' 
Initially, the INS would not consider an alien "known" unless the Service had 
"made an affirmative determination that the alien was subject to deportation 
proceedings."52 In response to practitioners' comments, the INS loosened its 
46 8 u.s.c. § 1255a(b). A timely application must be filed during the one-year period beginning 
eighteen months after the alien has been granted temporary residence. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1987). 
The continuous residence requirement will be met if the alien has not had a single absence exceeding 
thirty days, or multiple absences totalling greater than ninety days, between the date temporary 
residence was granted and the date an application was filed for permanent residence. [d. An alien is 
not admissible as an immigrant if he or she has been convicted of any felony or three or more 
misdemeanors. [d. at 16215. Possession of basic citizenship skills requires an alien to have a minimal 
understanding of ordinary English and a knowledge of the history and government of the United 
States, or to be pursuing a course of study recognized by the Attorney General as achieving these 
requirements. !d. 
47 [RCA. 52 Fed. Reg. 8752 (proposed March 19, 1987). 
"' See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987). 
49 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1986). 
51) 52 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1987). 
51 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206, 16,208 (1987). 
52 [d. at 16,206. 
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interpretation of "known to the Government." The looser interpretation in-
cludes information received by the INS from another federal agency prior to 
1982, indicating an alien's clear statement of unlawful status, if such information 
was subsequently placed in the alien's A-file. The regulations state that it is 
irrelevant if the INS had made a determination of status prior to this date. 53 
The "known to the Government" element of a legalization case is crucial to 
the many aliens who entered the United States legally but subsequently violated 
their status. A narrow interpretation of "known to the Government" could 
preclude legalization and cause these aliens to be deported. For example, in-
dividuals who failed to alert the INS of their illegal presence but paid taxes to 
the Internal Revenue Service, filed for a Social Security Card, or had contact 
with other federal agencies may arguably be "known to the Government." But, 
under the final INS regulations this information would not qualify as "known 
to the Government," and therefore, these individuals would be denied eligibility 
for the legalization procedures that will grant approximately two million other 
illegal aliens lawful presence.54 
III. Is THE INS INTERPRETATION OF "KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT" 
THEORETICALLY REASONABLE? 
"Known to the Government" was made a requirement of legalization in order 
to prevent otherwise lawful nonimmigrants from fraudulently creating docu-
mentation of illegal status." As will be seen, interpreting this phrase as "known 
to the INS" has become a pivotal issue in allowing or denying legalization.56 
The INS and practitioners have crafted legal arguments concerning the appro-
priate scope of the phrase. 
Although very little information is available concerning the INS's reason for 
its interpretation, the regulations state that the administrative burden would be 
too great if information held by all federal agencies was included in the "known 
to the Government" standardY The regulations also imply that the INS and 
the Attorney General are the only bodies able to make a valid determination of 
illegal status since they have sole control over implementation and enforcement 
of immigration laws. Therefore, information held by any other federal agency 
"[d. An A-file is the file kept by the INS for every known alien in the United States for whom 
agency action arises under the Immigration and Nationality laws. 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
IMMIGRATION AND PROCEDURE 23A-27 (1987). 
54 Drake, supra note 45, at 74. 
55 Letter from American Immigration Lawyers Assoc. to INS Assistant Commissioner for Legaliza-
tion at 4 (April 20, 1986) (commenting on INS proposed regulations) [hereinafter AILA Comments]. 
56 See Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 1163 
(W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
57 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987). 
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would be irrelevant because another agency's determination of illegal status 
would not be valid. 58 
It has been argued that a narrow interpretation may reduce the threat of 
future waves of illegal immigration which some people fear would occur if 
aliens believe a second amnesty bill is possible. 59 A narrow interpretation of the 
legalization provisions would avoid rewarding violations of U.S. immigration 
law and would strengthen a central purpose of IRCA, which is to develop 
effective enforcement strategies for illegal immigration.60 
Those opposing the INS's restrictive interpretation of "known to the Govern-
ment" contend that the broad language of the phrase and the congressional 
intent do not support such an interpretation. 6 ! Some practitioners believe an 
interpretation more in line with the language and intent would require an 
alien's status to be unlawful before January I, 1982 and to have been discovered 
by some federal agency or officer through the normal functioning of the federal 
government prior to the same date. 62 This interpretation is more favorable to 
aliens than the INS interpretation. It would increase the number of aliens 
eligible for legalization by accepting proof of unlawfulness held by any federal 
agency, rather than requiring the INS to have actual documentation in its official 
file. 53 
The marked difference in the opinions of practitioners and the INS concern-
ing this phrase makes a thorough analysis of the phrase necessary. This analysis 
will first address the amount of deference owed to an administrative body's 
decisions.'" Next the analysis will look to recent case law on the "known to the 
Government" issue,55 followed by an analysis of the phrase according to stan-
dard rules of statutory interpretation.56 Finally, the analysis will explore poten-
tial policy considerations of a narrow and broad interpretation.57 
A. Deference: A Question of Expertise or Ordinary Interpretation 
In instances where an administrative agency is given authority to administer 
a law, the agency's interpretation of the law is owed deference if the court finds 
5K See id. 
59 See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15; N. MONTWElLER, supra note 4, at 56. 
@ See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15. 
61 See, e.g., Lichtman, AILA Position Papers on Simpson-Rodino: Known to the Government, IMMIG. J. 17 
(Oct.-Dec. 1986). The INS received over 90 comments from practitioners stating that the interpretation 
was overly narrow and restrictive. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987). "[W]e believe the 'Government' referred 
to in the Immigration Reform and Control Act is more than a single agency (INS) and instead 
encompasses the executive branch of the Federal Government and its subordinate entities." Lichtman, 
supra, at 19. 
h2 See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 61, at 17. 
fi3 See Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
64 See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text. 
(i:-) See infra notes 87-156 and accompanying text. 
bll See infra notes 157-217 anel accompanying text. 
Iii 5;ee intra notes 218-44 and accompanying text. 
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that the interpretation is within the specialized expertise of the agency."" Alter-
natively, if the interpretation is one involving pure statutory construction, the 
court is qualified to determine the congressional intent by employing traditional 
rules of statutory interpretation, and therefore no deference is due to the 
agency.li9 The rule of deference is relevant only when ambiguity of meaning 
remains after the plain meaning rule has been applied, the legislative history 
has been examined, and other basic rules of statutory interpretation have been 
exhausted. 70 Where Congress chooses to delegate authority to an agency for 
the administration of an act, it may expressly or impliedly leave a gap for the 
agency to filP' If Congress expressly authorizes an agency to write regulations 
on specific issues, these regulations must be given controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.7" If Congress confers the 
authority more generally, the agency has an implicit right td fill the gaps, and 
a court may not overturn the agency unless the interpretation appears to be 
one that Congress would not have approved.7! 
In general, deference to administrative interpretation applies in situations 
involving technical decisions based on more than ordinary knowledge and un-
derstanding of the specific statutory policies. 71 It is assumed that the competence 
and experience of the agency is more specific to issues involving the statute, 
and therefore, a court should not be quick to substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency.7·' 
In Immigration and Naturalization Servia v. Cardow-Fonseca, a recent case ap-
plying IRCA, the court limited the "gap filling" authority of the INS to the 
application of the law on a case by case basis. 76 While deference is appropriate 
in cases where the agency has used its authority to applY the law to given facts, 
the court felt it did not owe deference to the INS's positions on issues of law. 77 
h< Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. l\iational Resources Defense Council. Inc, 467 U.S. WH. H4:,-44 (f9tH). 
h'l See Immigration & :--.iaturalization Service v. Cardoza· Fonseca. 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1220-21 (I91l7). 
711 Catholic Social St'rvices, Inc v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1371l, 13H:, (LD. Cal. 19H7). The rule of 
deference is "secondary to application of the plain meaning 1'ule, examinatioll of the legislati\'e history, 
and other tools of critical textual examination. Thus. administrati\'t:' interpretation, an extrinsic 
aid to construction, is only relcvallt \vhcre examination of the text and the legislative history leaves an 
unresolved ambiguity." fd. "The judiciary is the hnal authority OIl issues of statutory construction and 
must n.:ject administrative constructions which arc cOIltrary to dear cOIlgressional iIltent." Chevron, 
4G7 C.S. at H4:, n.9. 
71 Morton v. Rui/. 415 U.S. I ')9, 2~ I (19/c1). 
"Chenon, 4G7 U.S. at H4:l-44. 
7\ fd. at H4:l-4S. It sholiid be noted that these stami;mls difler. If Congress has delegated specific 
powers to create administrative regulatiolls, the court Illust accord great respect to these regulations. 
See td. at H44-45. But \vhere Congress has granted broad power to administer the statute and has not 
specifically mentioned authority to create regulations, the agellcy's power is merely implicit and a court 
\vould o\ve a lesser amount of deference. S'er id. 
" Sn irl. at H44. 
i:-) See id. 
7'; 107 S.Ct. 1221-22 (l9H7): ide at 122:,-25 (Scalia, J concurring). 
"fd.at 1221-22. 
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The Cardoza case involved a Nicaraguan citizen who entered the United States 
as a nonimmigrant and remained in the country after expiration of her visa. 
The INS eventually began deportation proceedings. The plaintiff asserted two 
defenses to deportation, withholding of deportation under INA § 243 and 
asylum as a refugee under INA § 208. Under § 243, an alien must prove a 
"clear probability of persecution" in the country of origin, while under § 208, 
the alien must prove a "well founded fear of persecution."78 The court held 
that deference is appropriate in a decision by the INS as to what facts meet 
either the § 208 "well founded fear test" or the § 243 "clear probability of 
persecution test," but the legal question, whether the two tests are substantially 
the same, is a question for the court and does not require deference to the 
INS.79 
In considering the role of deference in this situation, it is relevant to consider 
the scope of authority given to the Attorney General and the INS to create 
regulations. IRCA expressly delegates authority to the Attorney General to 
create regulations for the following purposes: (l) to define "resided continu-
ously," (2) to describe the necessary evidence needed to prove "resided contin-
uously," and (3) to implement the legalization process.so The regulations defin-
ing "known to the Government" are within the authority of the Attorney 
General to "fill the gap" in implementing legalization; therefore, a court would 
be bound to give a level of deference to the Attorney General and the INS.8! 
The question remains as to the appropriate level of deference. 
The rule stated in Cardoza provides a test to determine the level of deference 
a court will owe to an administrative agency's decision. 82 This rule applied to 
the "known to the Government" issue shows that a question pertaining to the 
sufficiency of evidence needed to prove knowledge in the pertinent government 
body would be a question of applying the facts of a case to the rule and 
therefore, would require deference to an INS decision. Alternatively, the issue 
whether "known to the Government" was intended to mean "known to the INS" 
or "known to any federal agency" is a question of law and therefore within the 
province of the court.S3 
More specifically, in IRCA Congress used two sections to differentiate the 
legalization requirements for general aliens and special circumstance aliens 
"fd. at 1209, 1212. 
'" Sre id. at 1221-22. In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, he concluded that deference was not 
due because the plain meaning and structure of the two sections are different and therefore Congress 
intended to have a different interpretation of the sections. /d. at 1224. 
HI' 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(g)(I) (Supp. 1986). 
HI See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
The level of deference a court owes would vary depending on whether the authority granted to the 
Attorney General is implicit or explicit. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
H2 Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221-22 (1987). 
H3 See id. 
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(Cubans and Haitians).H4 In § 201 which pertains to general aliens, Congress 
used the words "known to the Government," but in § 202 which pertains to 
Cuban and Haitian aliens, Congress requires a record of the alien to have been 
"established by the Immigration and Naturalization Service before January 1, 
1982."85 Therefore, whether § 201 of IRCA is substantially the same as § 202 is 
a question of law and does not require the traditional level of deference granted 
to an administrative agency.86 
B. Recent Cases Involving the" Known to the Government" Controversy 
Since the passage of IRCA in October 1986, three district courts have consid-
ered the "known to the Government" issue and have given contradictory hold-
ings. 87 The following analysis explains the facts which justify the conflict and 
pinpoint the differences in the courts' analyses. 
The initial query starts with the jurisdiction granted by IRCA to the INS and 
the courtS. 8B IRCA provides for a limited administrative review of status deter-
minations. BY This administrative review is done by an appellate authority estab-
lished by the Attorney General. YO The law also grants appellate and habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to federal courts in limited situations involving an order of 
deportationYI Within the appellate jurisdiction, a court may reverse an admin-
istrative finding only in the case of an abuse of discretion or if the finding is 
"directly contrary to clear and convincing facts contained in the [administrative] 
record considered as a whole. "Y2 The court's scope of review over habeas corpus 
petitions covers all questions concerning the constitutionality and validity of a 
deportation order. Y3 
Section 1255a(e)(I)(A) of 8 U.S.C., as amended by IRCA, provides for an 
interim procedure in which any alien apprehended before the legalization 
process begins may be granted a stay of deportation if he or she can prove a 
prima facie case of eligibility for legalizationY4 In two of the cases argued at 
84 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(a) (Supp. 1986) (IRCA § 201); IRCA, supra note 6, at § 202. 
8, 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(a) (Supp. 1986) (IRCA § 2(1); IRCA, supra note 6. at § 202. 
86 See Cardoza, 107 S.C!. 1221-22. 
"Ayuda v. Meese, No. 88-0625, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. March 31, 1988); Farzad v. 
Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
SH 8 U.s.c. §§ 1255a(f)(3)(A), 1255a(f)(4)(A) (Supp. 1986). 
HY 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 1986). 
g() [d. 
91Id. at § 1255a(f)(4)(A); see 8 U.s.c. § 1105a(a). Section l105a(a) provides federal appellate juris-
diction to review a final denial of a stay of deportation. In addition, § 1105a(a)(9) grants the district 
courts authority to review a denial of a stay of deportation through habeas corpus jurisdiction. 
9' 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(B). 
9S C. GORDON & G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW § 8.6(a) (Student Edition 1985). 
94 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(e)(l)(A). Meeting all four elements required for temporary residence would 
make a prima facie case. 52 Fed. Reg. 16.209 (1987); see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
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the district court level concerning the issue of "known to the Government," the 
INS determined the plaintiffs to be deportable prior to the commencement of 
legalization.95 In the INS proceedings, the plaintiffs were unable to show a 
prima facie case of legalization due to the restrictive interpretation of "known 
to the Government" contained in the administrative regulations; therefore, the 
INS denied their applications for a stay of deportation.96 
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York decided 
the first case, Kalaw v, Ferro, which considered the interpretation of "known to 
the Government."97 The petitioner, Violeta Kalaw; a citizen of the Philippines, 
first entered the United States in July 1973 with a nonimmigrant exchange 
visitor visa. The visa was due to expire in June 1979, but was extended until 
June 1980 and changed to !in H-l temporary worker visa. Subsequently, Ms. 
Kalaw applied for, and the court granted, two extensions of her visa which put 
her in lawful visa status through June 27,1982. The petitioner remained in the 
United States beyond this date, and, in January 1983, the Buffalo INS office 
granted her a right of voluntary departure by April 1, 1983.98 Kalaw sought 
political asylum in May 1985 which the court denied. g9 She was thereafter found 
to be deportable. Subsequent to the passage of IRCA, she applied under 8 
U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(l)(A) to the INS for a stay of deportation which was denied 
for failure to prove a prima facie case for legalization. loo The issue of whether 
the petitioner had made out a prima facie case turned on whether she had 
violated the requirements of her H-l status and whether this was "known to 
the Government" before January 1, 1982.101 
In reviewing the INS's denial of legalization, the district court held that a 
petitioner would be illegal if she regularly engaged in activity not authorized 
under her INS regulations. 102 In this case, the court found that the petitioner 
was in an illegal status prior to January 1, 1982. The court also considered the 
"known to the Government" phrase and found petitioner's status was known to 
95 Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690, 691-92 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 
1163, 1165 (W.D.N.V. 1987). 
96 Farzad, 670 F. Supp. at 692; Kalaw, 651 F. Supp. at 1166. 
97 Kalaw, 651 F. Supp. at 1163. 
'I" /d. at 1165. Voluntary departure is a phrase describing a procedure where deportable aliens make 
a type of "guilty plea" and are permitted to leave the United States without a formal deportation 
order. D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 72-73 (1987). The advantage to the INS is the 
avoidance of cost, delay, and difficult deportation proceedings. Id. The advantage to the alien is the 
increased flexibility and control he or she has over departure dates, the avoidance of a formal 
deportation order and re-entry restrictions, as well as the possible stigma associated with deportation. 
Id. 
'J'J Kalaw, 651 F. Supp. at 1165. 
lIlO Id. at 1166. 
lIllid. at 1170. 
lIl2Id. at 1169. 
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the Michigan Department of Civil Service, a state government agency, before 
January 1, 1982, but was unknown to the INS.IO~ 
In its holding, the court accepted the INS argument for limited interpretation 
because it believed the inclusion of all state and federal agencies "would make 
the administration of the Reform Act [IRCA] difficult."IO·' The court acknowl-
edged that other interpretations of the phrase were possible. "" It should be 
noted that the decision might have been different if the petitioner's status had 
been known to a federal agency. The court hinted that the free How of infor-
mation and constant interaction between agencies could warrant a more lenient 
interpretation. '01; 
On September 22, 1987, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas decided the Farzad v. Chandler case concerning the "known to 
the Government" issue.'o; The petitioner, Masoud Farzad, a native of Iran, 
entered the United States in September 1976 under a nonimmigrant student 
visa due to expire on June 1,1982."'" From December 24,1980 through April 
22, 1982, Mr. Farzad violated his status by engaging in unauthorized employ-
ment. In March 1982, the INS queried Mr. Farzad's employer and learned of 
the petitioner's status. On October 24, 1986, the INS issued an order of depor-
tation. On January 23, 1987, Mr. Farzad applied for a stay of deportation under 
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e)(I)(A), based on his prima facie case of eligibility for legali-
zation."'" The INS denied his application because he could not prove that his 
unlawful status was known to the INS before January 1, 1982 even though he 
did prove that the IRS and the Social Security Administration had records of 
his employment before January I, 1982.110 Upon receiving an order of depor-
tation from the INS, Mr. Farzad petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.'" 
'"3 [d. at 1169-70. The INS argued that Congress could not have intended "Government" to mean 
any state or federal agency, but instead must have intended to limit the meaning to the Attorney 
General or INS because these are the only entities charged with the administration of IRCA. /d. The 
INS also argued that knowledge by other agencies, especially state agencies, would be insignificant 
due to the sole administrative authority of the Attorney General. /d. 
'"4 [d. at 1170. 
1115 [d. at 1170 n.8. 
106 fri. 
107 Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
ItlH /d. at 691; 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(1') (1987). 
109 Farzad, 670 F. Supp. at 691-92. 
1111 [d. at 692, 694. 
'J J /d. at 691. Habeas corpus is a writ of ancient origin, the purpose of which is to obtain immediate 
relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those held in unlawful custody, or to obtain proper custody 
of persons detained. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (3d ed. 1969). The writ is used to test the 
constitutionality and validity of a deportation order and must be brought in the district in which the 
alien is imprisoned. 28 U.s.c. § 2241. See generally iMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 63.06 (C, 
Gordon & G. Gordon ed. 1987). 
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The district court first looked to the expressed intent of Congress concerning 
the meaning of "known to the Government." Since the court found no specific 
intent, it looked to the interpretation given by the INS and held that the INS's 
interpretation was not supported by the words of the statute and was not 
permissible in light of Congress' general intent. 112 The court cited IRCA and 
pointed out that in every other section, Congress refers specifically to the 
Attorney General or the INS, but in 8 U.S.C. § 1255a Congress used the broader 
term "Government."IIOl The court held that since Congress was aware of the 
Attorney General's exclusive administrative authority when it wrote the statute, 
and since Congress had specified the Attorney General or the INS in other 
sections of IRCA but had not done so in § 1255a(a)(2)(B), the INS interpretation 
was "impermissibly narrow."lll 
As further support for its broader interpretation, the Farzad court analyzed 
the practical effect of requiring the INS to know of an alien's illegal status 
before January 1, 1982.110 If the INS should fail to keep records of when it 
initially learned of or suspected a violation, it could effectively frustrate a 
nonimmigrant alien's ability to meet the burden of proof. The court accepted 
the petitioner's logic that no one could ever meet the INS requirement because 
they would either have been deported or not "known to the INS." The court 
held that the INS interpretation is not a permissible one because it effectively 
removes all nonimmigrant aliens from the reach of the provision. I I" 
II? Farzad, 670 F. Supp. at 692-93. "[IJf the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. :-.Iatural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
II" Farzad, 670 F. Supp. at 693. 
II'Id. 
115Id. at 694. 
III; Id. On October 13, 1987, respondent INS filed a motion to amend the findings or to alter or 
amend the judgment. Brief for Respondent, Farzad v. Chandler. 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) 
(No. 3-87-0256-G). The motion is based on two grounds. First, the INS proposes that the court went 
beyond its habeas corpus jurisdiction by granting declaratory judgments and injunctive relief. Id. at 
6-13. The court stated as reasoning for its holding that the regulations defining "known to the 
Government" are inconsistent with IRCA and outside the scope of the INS authority. Id. at 10. 
Additionally, the court held that the petitioner had made a prima facie case for legalization, although 
the decision whether a prima facie case has been made is a decision alleged to be solely within the 
control of the INS. Id. at 12. Respondent (INS) argues that these declaratory judgments and the 
injunctive relief, forbidding the INS from using its definition of "known to the Government" against 
Farzad, are outside the scope of the court's habeas corpus jurisdiction, and therefore the judgment 
should be amended. Id. at 10, 12. Second, the respondent also argues that the court's decision is hased 
on erroneous facts. /d. at 3-6. In an attempt to invalidate the court's reasoning that the regulatory 
interpretation effectively moots the application of 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B), respondent submitted 
affidavits of several INS officers describing the procedure for dating and retaining information 
received from outside sources. Id. at 4-6. 
In response, petitioner motioned the court for leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b). Brief for Petitioner, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 
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Although the Farzad case illustrates the court's opinion as to the the "known 
to the Government" issue, its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the alleged 
unlawful deportation because the court was petitioned under a writ of habeas 
corpus, Iii If the deportation is found to be unlawful, relief is limited to either 
a stay of deportation or, if the INS is unable to correct the deficiency of the 
deportation order, a conditional release of custody. I I" As described by the Su-
preme Court, the limited nature of judicial review of immigration decisions is 
apparent from the long recognized "power to expel or exclude aliens as a 
fundamental sovereign attribute ... largely immune from judicial control."II'! 
A district court's grant of habeas corpus is limited to those issues directly 
pertaining to the validity of the final order; therefore, the court's authority is 
limited to vacating the INS order and discharging the petitioner from custody.120 
On March 10, 1988, the INS filed a Notice of Appeal in Farzad v. Chandler.l2l 
Prior to submitting its appellate brief, the INS began to reconsider its position 
1987) (No. 3-87-0256-G). The petitioner hoped to amend the pleadings to allege that the regulations 
are arbitrary and capricious and thereby pray for invalidation as applied to any alien. See Petitioner's 
Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 
3-87-0256-G). Petitioner argues that since the "known to the Government" issue and the validity of 
the corresponding regulations have been litigated, an amendment would not produce injustice to 
either party. [d. at 2. In addition, petitioner argues that the court did not go beyond its habeas corpus 
jurisdiction because the issue of "known to the Government" was central to the issue of unlawful 
detention. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 
3-87-0256-G). Finally, petitioner discredits the factual errors alleged by respondent by asserting that 
the procedural affidavits submitted by the INS offices pertain to current procedures and state nothing 
about the procedure prior to January 1, 1982. !d. at 5-9. Therefore the affidavits are irrelevant to 
the current case. !d. 
OnJanuary 11, 1988 the INS's motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied. Order Denying 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-
87-0256-G). On the same day, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings. Order 
Denying Motion to Amend Pleadings, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-
87-0256-G). 
117 C. GORDON & (;. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW § 8.5 (1985). 
118 [d. at § 8.7(h). In Respondent's motion to amend the judgment, the INS argues the court went 
beyond its habeas corpus jurisdiction in granting declaratory and injunctive' relief. Brief for Respon-
dent, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-87-0256-G). The petitioner has 
responded with an argument that since the stay of deportation granted under § 1255a(e)(I)(A) is 
mandatory and not discretionary, the issue is a question of law and therefore within the authority of 
the court. Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 
3-87-0256-G). Additionally, petitioner alleges that when the statute required a prima facie case for 
legalization as a prerequisite for the mandatory stay of deportation, Congress effectively combined 
the issues of legality of custody and eligihility for legalization. !d. at 13. On January 11, 1988, the 
court denied the I NS's motion to amend or alter the judgment. Order Denying Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-87-0256-G). 
119 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). 
leo C. GORDON & G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW § 8.7(h) (1985); Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937-39 (1983). 
121 Motion to Withdraw Appeal at 1, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 
3-87-0256-G). 
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in light Of Ayuda v. Mme. '22 The Ayuda decision, as described below, clearly 
favors the plaintiff's position in the Farzad case and declares the INS "known 
to the Government" regulations contrary to law. m After considering this case, 
the INS motioned the court under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to withdraw its appeal. 124 The motion was granted on May 24, 1988, 
arid the appeal was duly dismissed. I"' 
The third case to consider the "known to the Government" issue was Ayuda 
v. Meese, decided by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
on March 30, 1988. 12'; The case was brought by five nonimmigrant aliens who, 
but for the narrow interpretation of "known to the Government," would be 
eligible for legalization, and four organizations whose core function is immi-
gration counseling. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on 
the basis that the administrative interpretation of the "known to the Govern-
ment" requirement is unreasonable and it unlawfully excludes certain nonim-
migrant aliens from the legalization procedure. m 
In defense of the action, the defendants challenged the justiciability of the 
case on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had not exhausted the 
administrative remedies specified in IRCAY" The court addressed the standing 
issue in detail, finding the organizations to have standing to challenge the 
contradictory interpretations of the INS regulations and the Farzad holding. 
The court came to this conclusion because the organizations' core function, to 
provide immigration counseling, requires a clear and correct interpretation of 
the legalization provisions. 12" The organizations' inability to express a clear 
interpretation of the immigration laws prevented the proper performance of 
their core functions and therefore created an injury in fact. The court concluded 
that the plaintiff-organizatiuns' interests are within the zone of interest of IRCA 
and therefore the plaintiffs have standing. I"" 
In Avuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,9.22 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 19811) (No. 88-0625) (Memorandum 
Opinion and Order). 
1'''ld. at 51,805. 
I" Motion to Withdraw Appeal at 2, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 
3-87 -0256-(;). 
".i Entrv of Dismissal, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (I';.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-87-0256-G). 
"" Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPn (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-(625). 
I" !d. at 51,792. 
'" 1<1. at 51,795. 
I" hi. at 51,796. The court was specifically concerneQ with two of the plaintiff-organizations who 
have contracts with the INS to serve as Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs). Jd. at 51,797. The 
contracts require the organizations to comply with all INS regulations. Id. Given this contractual 
l"elation, if standing is denied, these organizations may be compelled by contractual obligations to 
ent<>rce unlawful regulations ""ithout the opportunity to challenge the interpretations. fd. 
ll<) Ir!. at 51,799. The court did not reach the standing issue as it pertains to the individual plaintiffs. 
Id. ~t 51,800 n.'l. 
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Judge Sporkin rejected the defendant's second challenge to the case's justi-
ciability because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is irrel-
evant to the plaintiffs. Sporkin noted that since IRCA does not provide an 
administrative remedy to plaintiff-organizations harmed by conflicting inter-
pretations of the law, these plaintiffs may find a remedy only in federal court. 131 
After rejecting the challenges to the justiciability of the case, Judge Sporkin 
looked to the plain meaning of the phrase "known to the Government" and 
described the language as "crystal clear."m The court then considered the 
context of the phrase within the statute and concluded that Congress exhibited 
its ability to distinguish between the INS and the federal government in many 
sections of the law. "J:l The court found Congress' decision to use different 
language in §§ 201 and 202 of IRCAu4 to be "exceptionally telling evidence 
that Congress meant Government when it said Government."135 
Next, the court looked to the legislative history to corroborate the plain 
meaning of the language of the statute. Although neither party was able to find 
specific history pertaining to the "known to the Government" phrase, the court 
interpreted the lack of history as evidence of the self-explanatory nature of the 
language. I"" The court also looked to the broader intent of Congress and found 
that the extensive remedial purpose of the statute would be undercut by the 
INS's narrow interpretation of "known to the Government."1:)7 
Finally, the court recognized that the INS requirement removes virtually all 
nonimmigrant aliens from eligibility for legalization. As noted by the Farzad 
court, an alien who was known by the INS to be illegally present since 1982 is 
very likely to have been deported before 1986, when IRCA was written.l:JH In 
addition, even if such information was given to the INS and the alien had not 
been deported, the likelihood of the information being contained in an INS 
A-file is remote. "'" 
The court concluded that the alien plaintiffs and their class will be irreparably 
harmed if the regulations are not enjoined because these individuals will be 
deterred from applying for amnesty before the May 4, 1988 deadline. In accord, 
the court also found that any minor harm that the Government may suffer 
from the granting of an injunction is clearly outweighed by the substantial 
injury which the plaintiffs will suffer if the injunction were not granted. Finally, 
1:\1 fd. at "I,HOO. 
l:\~ fri. 
III fd. at 51 ,SO I (ciling Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690, 693 (N .D. Tex. 1987)). 
1:1.1 ,)'ee supra notes H1-H6 and (lccompanving text; see infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. 
"" Ayucla \'. Meese, 46 EPt) (CCH) ~ ~7.922 at 51,HOI. 
1:\1; fd. at 51,802 n.16. 
IT; ,)'n supra noles 19R-217 and accompanying text. 
1:1< Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690. 694 (I';.n. Tex. 1987). 
II" Ayuda v. Meese, 46 Ern (CUI) ~ 37,922 at "I.H05. 
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since the public interest is benefitted by the facilitation of IRCA's purpose, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. 140 
The court's holding declared the word "Government," as used in the phrase 
"known to the Government," to mean the entire United States Government, 
and declared the INS regulation contrary to law. The court enjoined the INS 
from further application of the regulations and ordered the INS to notify all 
persons affected by the regulation of the court's decision. 141 
At the time of the Ayuda decision, the INS had made little or no effort to 
change its regulations to comply with the Farzad decision. 142 While discussing 
the relevant provisions of law concerning the "known to the Government" 
requirement, Judge Sporkin clearly stated that despite the Farzad decision which 
declared the INS regulations interpreting the "known to the Government" 
phrase to be unlawful, "the INS has continued to use these regulations, without 
any modification to accord with the Farzad decision."143 
Subsequent to the Ayuda decision, Judge Sporkin issued a series of supple-
mental orders which clearly reject the INS's narrow interpretation of "known 
to the Government" and reinforce the Farzad and Ayuda opinions. 144 These 
orders require the INS to commence processing of applications filed prior to 
May 5, 1988 under the court's broader interpretation of the phrase. On May 
17, 1988, the INS implied its willingness to acquiesce to these orders when it 
finalized its decision not to appeal the Ayuda holding. 145 The plaintiffs, however, 
did not believe the INS's actions exhibited compliance with the court's orders, 
and, on July 21, 1988, they filed a motion to hold the defendants in contempt 
of court. 146 On July 22, 1988, Judge Sporkin heard the arguments and held the 
motion in abeyance. 147 
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants are not granting legalization to 
those aliens who meet the court's "known to the Government" standard and are 
otherwise eligible for legalization. 148 Although the INS has accepted "known to 
the Government" applications, according to the plaintiffs, the INS has not 
140/d. 
141/d. 
142/d. at 51,794. 
143 [d. 
144 Motion to Hold the Defendants in Contempt or, in the Alternative to Compel Compliance with 
the Court's Orders at 2, Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-
0625) 
145 Reply of Plaintiffs to Defendants Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants in Con-
tempt or, in the Alternative to Compel Compliance With the Court's Orders at 2, Ayuda v. Meese, 46 
EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625). 
146 Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt or, in the Alternative to Compel Compliance With the 
Court's Orders, Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625). 
147 Civil Docket for Case 88-CV-625, Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 
1988). 
148 [d. at I. 
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processed these applications and the local legalization offices continue to rec-
ommend denial. The plaintiffs point to an INS Central Office Directive which 
instructs local offices to take no final action on "known to the Government" 
applicants and to recommend denial of the applicants. 149 
In response to plaintiff's motion to hold defendants in contempt, the INS 
argued that it has fully complied with the court's orders. The INS indicated 
that it has issued three wires to its field offices concerning the processing of 
"known to the Government" applications. The first wire was sent on April 1, 
1988. This wire instructed legalization office managers to accept "known to the 
Government" applications, adjudicate them, forward them to Regional Process-
ing Facilities (RPFs) and issue work authorization to the aliens. ISO The second 
wire was sent on April 11, 1988 and it contained similar instructions. The second 
wire also instructed local offices to "check #5 in block B of the examiner's 
worksheet." Item #5 is labelled "verification requested" and is not a denial or 
a grant of legalization. Item #5 causes the document to be sent to a RPF for 
further processing and a final adjudication. The April 11 wire indicated that 
final decisions on "known to the Government" applicants should be withheld 
by RPFs until further guidance is given by the INS Central Office. lSI The third 
wire was issued on April 15, 1988 and it instructed field personnel not to impose 
a filing fee on any "known to the Government" applicant. ls2 
According to the INS, the procedure for processing "known to the Govern-
ment" applications has not changed since the finalization of the Ayuda case. 
Prior to the Ayuda holding, the INS accepted "known to the Government" 
applications in their local legalization offices, recommended them for denial 
and sent them to the RPFs where they were held until instructions from the 
Central Office were received. These procedures have not changed in light of 
the Ayuda decision. ls3 
The INS argues that recommendations for denial by the local legalization 
offices do not violate the court orders because the recommendations may be 
rejected by the RPFs who make the final determinations. The INS argues that 
no proof has been given that the RPFs have denied or plan to deny these 
applications, therefore the motion for contempt should be denied. ls4 
It should be noted that the April 11, 1988 wire instructed RPFs to hold final 
decisions on "known to the Government" applicants in abeyance until further 
149 [d. at 1-3. 
150 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants in Contempt or, in the Alter-
native to Compel Compliance With the Court's Orders at 6-7, Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 
(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625). 
151 !d. at 5-6, attachment D. 
152 [d. at 5. 
I.;3 [d. at 8-9 n.7. 
154 [d. at 10. 
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notice was provided by the INS Central Office, The defendants do not indicate 
that any further instructions have been issued by the INS Central Office, al-
though the INS decided not to appeal the Ayuda decision on May 17, 1988. 155 
It may be argued that the INS's failure to update the April 11, 1988 instructions 
to the RPFs is an example of noncompliance with the court's orders. 156 
C. Statutory Interpretation 
In this section, this Comment will consider the conflict which currently exists 
between the recent court interpretations of the phrase "known to the Govern-
ment" and the INS regulatory interpretation of the phrase in light of the 
traditional rules of statutory interpretation. The initial inquiry of statutory 
interpretation is to the plain meaning of the statutory words. 157 If the words of 
the statute are unambiguous, the usual canon of interpretation is that courts 
are bound by the assumption that legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used. 15H Courts believe that Congress is able to 
express its intent at the time of the creation of a statute, and therefore subse-
quent interpretation by courts is limited by the expressed intent in the plain 
meaning of the words. 15g Although the courts are bound by this rule, it is often 
difficult to determine if the plain meaning of the statute is "unambiguous and 
apparent." Therefore, a thorough analysis will look to legislative history to 
ensure that the alleged plain meaning does not contradict expressed legislative 
intent. 160 
1. Plain Meaning 
The initial inquiry In interpreting the words of a statute must be to their 
plain meaning. 161 Aliens who entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 
and subsequently violated their visa status are challenging the validity of the 
INS's narrow interpretation of "known to the Government" as contrary to the 
plain meaning of the words. 162 These individuals claim that the plain meaning 
155 Reply of Plaintiff's to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants in 
Contempt or, in the Alternative to Compel Compliance With the Court's Orders at 2, Ayuda v. Meese, 
46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625). 
I'b [d. at 2-3. 
157 Consumer Product Safety Commissioner v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
158 American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). 
1'4 United States v. James, 106 S.C!. 3116, 3122-23 (1986). 
160 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); United 
States v. James, 106 S.C!. at 3122-23. 
Hil Consumer Product Safety Commissioner v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
16' See Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 (D. D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625); Farzad v. 
Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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of the word "Government" includes all governmental agencies,163 whereas the 
INS believes that "Government" was intended to mean the INS.";4 
The ordinary dictionary definition of the word "Government," especially 
when it is capitalized, includes all of the federal agencies of the government, 
not just the INS. 11;-, In support of the dictionary definition, the court in State 
Bank otAlban)' v. United States interpreted the word "Government," in its ordinary 
sense, to mean the federal government. 11;6 In that case, a taxpayer had followed 
an IRS mimeograph which allowed the taxpayer to use a given formula to 
exclude certain receivables from income. 1m The formula referred to "Govern-
ment insured loans," and the taxpayer argued that this phrase did not include 
state insured loans. II;" The court interpreted "Government" by applying the 
plain meaning rule. II;'! The court cited Webster's 3rd International Dictionary 
and the use of the word by the Wall Street .Journal to reach its holding that the 
plain meaning of the word "Government" refers only to the federal govern-
ment. 17" This case is particularly relevant to the case at hand because it involves 
an agency, the IRS, which had interpreted a statute it has sole authority to 
administer, the Internal Revenue Code. 
In addition to the plain meaning, the context of the phrase within the statute 
is relevant in interpreting the statute. 171 The maxim of construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius means that when the legislature uses particular language 
in one section of a statute and different language in another, similar section of 
the same statute, it intends something different in each case.172 
Although the plain meaning of the word "Government" usually includes all 
federal agencies and therefore cuts against the INS's regulatory interpretation, 
11;:1 Farzad, 670 F. Supp. at 692-~l3; Kalaw, 651 F. Supp. at 1169. 
lid "'2 Fed. Reg. 16.20H (1987). 
II;', Sn WEBSTER'S :'RD IN IER"ATIO"AL DICTIONARY 982-83 (4th ed. 1976). "Government" (when 
spelled wilh a capital letter) is defined as usuallv referring to the "executive branch of the U.S. Federal 
Government including the political officials and usu[ally] the permanent civil service employees." fd. 
"Covernment" is also defined in part as "[t]he whole class or body of officeholders or functionaries 
considered in the aggregate, upon whom revolvcs the executive,judicial, legislative, and administrative 
business of the Slate." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625-26 (5th ed. 1979). Finally, Ballentine's Law 
Dictionary defines "goyernmcnt" in part as a "term usuallv applied to the government of the United 
States." BALLE"TI"E's LAW DICTIONARY 530 (3d ed. 1969). 
166 530 F.2d 1379. LlH2 (Ct. CI. 1976). Although the court stated that capitalization of "Government" 
refers to the United States federal government, the court was unable to apply this rule of grammar 
because the word in question came at the beginning of the sentence. fd. In 8 lJ.S.c. § 1255a(a)(2)(B), 
the word "Government" appears in the middle of the sentence, and it is capitalized. 
II;; Id. at 13HO-H I. 
Ib'Ir!. at l3H I-H2. 
Ib'I/d. at 13H2. The court held that the rule of statutory interpretation, where words of a statute are 
to be applied in their ordinary and commonly understood sense, applies "with equal force to [an IRS] 
mimeograph." !d. 
170 fri. at I 382-R3. 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972). 
I" Iri.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY "'21 (5th ed. 197~l). 
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the word cannot be considered out of context from the rest of the phrase. 173 In 
this case the word "known" may be argued to include a more technical knowl-
edge than simply holding evidence of unlawfulness.I74 More specifically, tech-
nical knowledge would require an INS determination of unlawfulness prior to 
January 1, 1982.175 Since the INS is the only body competent to evaluate if an 
alien's activities are in violation of visa status and therefore unlawful, it is 
arguable that "known" must mean known to the INS.176 Following from this 
premise, it may be argued that another federal agency's knowledge of unlaw-
fulness is derivative of an INS determination, and therefore INS knowledge is 
a prerequisite to "knowledge" of another agency.177 
Although the plain meaning of a statute is not the sole criterion of interpre-
tation, it is not easily discounted.178 It may be argued that the plain meaning of 
the word "known" is not limited to knowledge of the INS. If Congress had 
intended such a limitation it could have specified that the knowledge require-
ment could only be fulfilled by a prior INS determination of the alien's unlawful 
status. I79 The court in Kalaw v. Ferro did not believe the requirement of knowl-
edge was a technical one, stating that "unlawful status" refers to activity which 
generally is not in accord with an alien's visa requirements. ISO 
In addition, when used together, "known" and "Government" may create a 
requirement of knowledge held by the government as a whole, rather than by 
a single agency.IHI For this interpretation of the knowledge requirement to be 
met, some federal agency must hold evidence which the INS could use to 
determine illegal status, regardless of whether the INS actually has the evidence 
or has made the determination. I82 Therefore, if the government as an entity 
possesses evidence which could lead to a determination of unlawfulness, the 
alien's status would be "known to the Government" and "known" would not be 
limited to knowledge of the INS. 
173 Brief for Respondent at 2, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. 3-87-
0256-G). 
li4 See id. 
li5/d. 
176 !d. The proposed regulations implementing the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which define "resident 
alien" and "non-resident alien" for tax purposes may weaken this argument. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34,230 
(proposed Sept. 10, 1987). Specifically, in the case of an F-I student visa, the regulations allow the 
IRS to determine if a student is in "substantial compliance" with the terms of his or her visa in order 
to decide if the student's time in the United States will count toward the "substantial presence" test of 
alien residency. Id. at 34,236. This raises an issue concerning the IRS's authority to determine the 
immigration status of an alien, at least for its own purposes. 
177 Brief for Respondent at 2, Farzad, 670 F. Supp. 690. 
178 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 (1987). 
179 See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 73. 
180 Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
m See Brief of Amici Curiae at 16 n.S, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
1" Id. 
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In IRCA, Congress has differentiated the requirements for eligibility of le-
galization between general aliens and special circumstance aliens (Cubans and 
Haitians).183 The general requirements for legalization are in § 201 of IRCA 
where the phrase "known to the Government" is found. 184 Immediately follow-
ing the § 201 general requirements is § 202 pertaining to more lenient proce-
dures which allow Cubans and Haitians to become immediately eligible for 
permanent residence if they meet certain requirements. ISS The Cuban-Haitian 
eligibility requirements for legalization are similar to the preceding section's 
general requirements, except that in § 202 Congress has clearly stated that it 
requires knowledge by the INS, rather than "the Government."186 
This situation is similar to ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States where the 
court found that two standards with similar but not identical wordings were 
intended to have different meanings. 187 Furthermore, in § 201 of IRCA, which 
contains all of the general legalization policies, the word "Government" is used 
four times, including the phrase "known to the Government."IS8 All of these 
occurrences, excluding the one in question, refer expressly or impliedly to the 
federal government. 189 For example, within one paragraph of § 201, Congress 
refers to the Attorney General and "other appropriate heads of the various 
departments and agencies of Government," implying that Congress did not 
consider the two parties one and the same. 190 The distinction in phraseology 
implies that Congress intended to give a different meaning by using different 
language. 191 There are thirty instances in § 201 which refer to the Attorney 
General or the INS by name instead of broadly as "Government."192 
In accordance with the expressio unius principle, as illustrated in ITT Arctic 
Service,193 it may be assumed that when Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, 
Congress acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion or exciusion. 194 There-
183 See 8 U.s.C. § 1255a(a) (Supp. 1986) (IRCA § 201); IRCA, supra note 6, at § 202. 
184 Jd.; 8 U.S.c. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (lRCA § 201). 
185 See IRCA, supra note 6, at § 202. 
186 See id. at § 202(b)(2). 
187 524 F.2d 680, 688 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The court held that where one paragraph of a contract used 
the phrase "Canadian Department of Labour" and another paragraph used the phrase "Canadian 
Government," the discrepancy was intentional and "Government" was used in a broader sense than 
"Department of Labour." [d. 
I" See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a)(2)(B), (1')(2), (h)(I)(A)(i) (IRCA § 2(1); IRCA, supra note 6. at § 201(c)(2). 
189 See 8 U.S.c. §§ 1255a(a)(2)(B), (f)(2), (h)(l)(A)(i) (IRCA § 201); IRCA, supra note 6, at § 201(c)(2). 
190 !d. at § 1255a(h)(I)(A)(i). 
191 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
192 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a), (a)(I)(A), (a)(I)(C), (b)(I). (b)(I)(D)(i)(II). (b)(I)(D)(ii), (b)(I)(D)(iii), (b)(2), 
(b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B), (c)(I), (c)(I)(A), (c)(l)(B), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(5), (c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(B), 
(d)(2)(B)(i), (d)(2)(B)(ii), (e)(I), (e)(2), (f)(3)(A), (g)(I)(A), (g)(I), (g)(2)(B), (g)(2)(C), (g)(3) (1986). 
193 ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. l'nited States, 524 F.2d 680, 688 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
194 See United States v. Wong Kim Bo. 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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fore, it would be illogical to assume Congress, in writing IRCA, intended the 
same meaning in both §§ 201 and 202 even though it used different language.!95 
As is apparent after analyzing the meaning of the words "known" and "Gov-
ernment" within the context of the statute, there is still a question as to the 
intent of Congress in its use of this phrase. Although the plain meaning strongly 
favors an interpretation of "Government" including all federal agencies, !96 it is 
less clear whether the interpretation of "known" refers to knowledge of any 
federal agency or technical knowledge of unlawfulness which can only be as-
certained by the INS,!97 Therefore, the legislative history must be examined to 
discern the legislative intent. 
2. Legislative History 
Since Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens, !ge 
the interpretation of immigration laws must include a consideration of Congress' 
intent in writing the relevant statute. Although the legislative history of IRCA 
does not express a specific intent on the narrow issue of interpreting "known 
to the Government," the objective of IRCA is "to establish a reasonable, fair, 
orderly, and secure system of immigration into this country and not to discrim-
inate in any way against particular nations or people."!99 The Senate's primary 
goal in establishing a legalization program is to eliminate the illegal subclass in 
the United States while attempting not to waste money by locating individuals 
who are well settled in the country. zoo The Senate desires to grant legalization 
to those aliens who are "well settled" in the United States.20! No distinction is 
made in the Senate Report between illegal border entry and legal entry followed 
by a violation of visa rules in determining the treatment of illegal aliens. 202 Both 
initial illegal entrants and non immigrants who subsequently became illegal have 
195 See Russello v. United St<Ites, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). "We would not presume to ascribe this 
difference [between sections of the same statute] to a simple mistake in draftsmanship." [d. 
196 See sup". notes 165-70 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 173-95 and accompanying text. 
198 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U,S. 787, 792 (1977). 
199 Statement by President of the United States, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5856-64 
(Nov. 6, 1986) (pertaining to IRCA). 
200 S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 16. As stated in the Senate Report, the legalization procedure 
seeks two major goals: 
[d. 
The first is to avoid wasteful use of Immigration and Naturalization Service's limited 
enforcement resources. The United States is unlikely to obtain as much enforcement for its 
dollar if the INS attempts to locate and deport those who have become well settled in this 
country .... 
The second is to eliminate the illegal subclass now present in our society .... 
201 [d.; see also H.R. REP. No. 682, supm note 21, at 49. Originally, "well settled" was intended to be 
measured by continuous residence since January I, 1980, but when the final statute was enacted a 
January I, 1982 cutoff was adopted. See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15; 8 U,S.C. § 1255a(a)(2) 
(Supp. 1986). 
202 See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15-16. But see H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 21, at 72. 
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breached U.S. laws.203 No distinction is expressed by the Senate to imply that 
Congress intended to grant amnesty to illegal border entrants while denying 
amnesty to nonimmigrants,204 and yet, only nonimmigrants would be affected 
by a restrictive interpretation of "known to the Government."205 
The House Report considered both aliens and nonimmigrants together in 
recognizing that employment opportunity is the primary reason why aliens 
either enter the United States illegally or violate their status.206 The legalization 
program was established in recognition of the fact that the INS has not had 
control over illegal immigration in the past, and this has allowed both immigrant 
and nonimmigrant aliens to enter the country.207 Therefore, the solution is to 
legalize those who have been here for a long time. 20s 
The House Report states an intention to create sufficient openness and flex-
ibility to encourage qualified aliens to step forward and to ensure that they 
receive a legalized status. 20'l The Report also states an intent to use sufficient 
care to avoid legalization of those with fraudulent claims while rewarding only 
those long-time residents Congress deemed worthy of amnesty.2l0 The House 
Report emphasizes an efficient legalization process available to all legitimate (as 
opposed to fraudulent) claims.2ll Both the House and Senate Reports provide 
general statements of purpose which stress the importance of a generous pro-
gram to accept those aliens who have become an integral part of American 
society.2l2 
Although the House Report states that nonimmigrant aliens will not be 
deemed unlawful solely because of "technical violations of their terms of en-
try,"2l:l the report goes on to state that: 
[u ]necessarily rigid demands for proof of eligibility for legalization 
could seriously impede the success of the legalization effort. There-
fore, the Committee expects the INS to incorporate flexibility into 
"," SfC S. REP. :-.in. 132.lul"a note 20. at 20-21, The Senate Report states that aliens: "have breached 
our nation's immigration laws, displaced many American citizens from jobs, and placed an increased 
financial burden on mailY States and local governments," /d. 
"" Sff S. RE,!'. No. 132,lupra note 20, at 15-16, 18-26. But see H.R. REP. No. 682, .,upm note 21, at 
n 
",', H U.s.c. § 125.'>a(<I)(2) (Supp, 1986), 
~()h H.R. REP. No. 682. supra note ~ I, at 46. "Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here 
illegally or, in the case of non immigrants, leads them to accept employnlent in violation of their status." 
/d, 
"" Set II.R, REP, :-.in, 682. "upm note 21,. at 4~, The House Report states "that pa,t failures to 
eIltorcc~ [sic] the immigration laws have allowed them [immigrants and nonimmigrantsl to enter and 
to settle here." fri. 
~W, 5,'ef /(1. 
"", Id, at 73, 
~IO See id. 
"'Id, 
'" S" id, at 71-72; S. REP, No. 132, '''pm note 20. at 15. 
"'l H,R, REP. "10. 6H2, supra note 21, at 72, 
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the standards for legalization eligibility, permitting the use of affi-
davits of credible witnesses and taking into consideration the special 
circumstances relating to persons previously living clandestinely in 
this country.214 
These two thoughts imply that the House did not intend minor violations of 
visa rules to allow an alien to become eligible for legalization, while it did intend 
to treat aliens equitably. 
In addition, the legislative history states that Congress intended that the 
legalization procedures should be carried out in a generous fashion.215 The class 
of aliens intended to benefit from legalization are those individuals who have 
been in the United States for a number of years, have become members of their 
community, and have built social networks here. 216 The House "strongly believes 
that a one-time legalization program is a necessary part of an effective enforce-
ment program and that a generous program is an essential part of any immi-
gration reform legislation."217 
D. Policy Considerations of a Broad Interpretation of "Government" 
The primary purpose of the "known to the Government" phrase is to prevent 
otherwise lawful nonimmigrants from fraudulently creating documentation of 
acts which make them "illegal" in order to qualify for legalization.218 Beyond 
protection against fraud, there is no clear purpose for the "known to the 
Government" requirement. 21 " Once a nonimmigrant's illegal status is verified 
by a reliable third party, there is no more need for scrutiny of a nonimmigrant 
than there is for an alien who entered the United States without inspection.220 
214 fd. at 73. 
m !d. at 49,72. The House Report states an intention to have the legalization program "implemented 
in a liberal and generous fashion, as has been the historical pattern with other forms of administrative 
relief granted by Congress." fd. at 72. 
216 !d. at 49. 
217 fd. 
,,, AILA Comments, supra note 55, at 4. "By requiring that the evidence of unlawful status be in 
the hands of the Government ... the Act limits eligibility to those for whom there is objective evidence 
from a reliable, third-party source." fd. As to general documentary requirements for eligibility for 
legalization, 
a balanced and flexible approach should be taken in evaluating an applicant's testimony and 
the overall sufficiency and probative value of the evidence he or she has provided to support 
his or her claim to eligibility. Discretion should also be applied in the types and quantities of 
documents requested .... The inference drawn from the documents provided should depend 
not on quantitv alone, but on the reliability, credihility and amenability to verification. 
Documentary Requirements to Establish Eligibility Under § 245A of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), INS File Co 1588-C, reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1172 (1987); 
,,'e a/so Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 at 51,803 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (No. 88-0625). 
~19 Sf'(' AILA Comments, supra note 55, at 4. 
'"0 fd. 
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1. Policies Supporting a Narrow Interpretation 
The INS's limited interpretation of "known to the Government" may decrease 
the administrative burden which will be created by a broad interpretation of 
"Government."221 The INS argues that since the Attorney General and the INS 
are the sole administrative authorities of IRCA, they are the only competent 
bodies able to decide if an alien was illegal prior to Jan uary 1, 1982.222 There-
fore, allowing the standard to be met by knowledge of any federal agency would 
greatly increase the INS's burden without increasing the validity of the knowl-
edge. 
The administrative burden is apparent from the massive filing of legalization 
applications that has created a demand for the INS to provide aliens with 
documentation from their A-files.223 The procedure of getting information from 
an A-file requires filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 224 Be-
cause of the large number of FOIA filings, the INS has authorized aliens to file 
amnesty applications without the results of their FOIA request. 225 This author-
ization will help those aliens who are certain that their illegal status was "known 
to the INS" before January 1, 1982 because they are now permitted to file their 
applications without actual documentation. 226 The authorization will not alle-
viate the problem of proving knowledge of illegal status for aliens who are not 
sure if the INS knew of their status.227 The backlog of FOIA requests poses a 
major obstacle to aliens who are unsure whether the INS had knowledge of 
their unlawful status. Aliens are prohibited under the INS approach from using 
information outside of their A-file to prove "knowledge of the Government" 
and yet they cannot obtain timely information concerning the contents of their 
A-file. 228 This information is necessary for an accurate application by the May 
4, 1988 deadline and since the application fee is not refundable, most aliens in 
this position were deterred from submitting an application.229 
Another policy consideration in favor of limiting the "known to the Govern-
ment" phrase is the fear of creating new waves of illegal immigration.230 A 
generous reading of the legalization provisions may encourage future increases 
m 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987). 
222 [d. This argument is similar to the controversy discussed earlier over the interpretation of 
"known." See supra notes 173-95 and accompanying text. 
223 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1172 (1987). 
224 [d. at 1173. 
225 Minimizing G-641 Requests Relevant to Legalization Applicants, INS File Co 1588-P, reprinted in 
64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1173 (1987). 
226 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1173 (1987). 
227 [d. 
228 See id. 
229 52 Fed. Reg. 16,206 (1987); Ayuda v. Meese, 46 EPD (CCH) ~ 37,922 at 51,803 (D.D.C Mar. 30, 
1988) (No. 88-0625). 
230 See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15; N. MONTWEILER, supra note 4, at 56. 
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in illegal immigration due to expectations of an expanding amnesty.231 In ad-
dition, some representatives voting on the bill believed amnesty was a reward 
for lawbreakers.232 This implies that any legalization program should be inter-
preted narrowly. 
2. Policies Supporting a Broad Interpretation 
An interpretation of Government which includes all federal agencies who 
have a free flow of information and constant interaction233 would not undermine 
the evidentiary purpose of the provision.234 The federal agencies would provide 
their own authentic records containing evidence of the alien's status prior to 
1982.235 In this respect, any federal agency would be considered a reliable third 
party for purposes of providing evidence of illegal status.236 
In addition, if the INS is the only body whose knowledge is relevant for 
purposes of the "known to the Government" requirement, virtually all nonim-
migrants will be excluded from legalization.237 The determination of an alien's 
status prior to January 1, 1982 occurs when the alien applies for legalization.23B 
According to the INS regulations, an INS examiner may look only to infor-
mation held in an alien's A-file to find evidence of illegal status prior to January 
1, 1982.239 Since the examiner must make the determination based on authentic 
records created before January 1, 1982,240 it would be impossible for an alien 
to subsequently create an illegal status. Requiring the INS to have had the 
information in the alien's A-file prior to 1982, imposes an extra-legislative 
requirement on any nonimmigrant otherwise able to prove his illegal status 
through records held by another federal agency.241 Since a majority of nonim-
migrant aliens do not have an INS A-file, or would have been subject to de-
portation if proof of illegal status was in their file, the effect of a narrow 
interpretation would be to exclude virtually all nonimmigrants from the legal-
ization procedures.242 
The fear of creating new flows of illegal immigration is a strong concern of 
critics of the new law. This fear, however, applies equally to all illegal aliens, 
231 See S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15; N. MONTWEILER, supra note 4, at 56. 
232 N. MONTWEILER, supra note 4, at 56-57. 
233 See Kalaw v. Ferro. 651 F. Supp. 1163. 1170 n.8 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
234 See AILA Comments. supra note 55. at 4-5. 
235 [d. 
236 [d. 
237 Farzad v. Chandler. 670 F. Supp. 690. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
238 AILA Comments. supra note 55, at 5. 
239 Immigration and Naturalization Act. 8 C.F.R. § 245a (1987). 
240 See AILA Comments. supra note 55. at 5. 
241 [d. 
242 Farzad v. Chandler. 670 F. Supp. 690. 694 (N.D.Tex. 1987). 
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whether nonimmigrants or illegal border entrants. The legislative history 
stresses the fact that this is a one-time legalization program in order to di8pel 
expectations of future amnesty bills.24:l Although several members of the Select 
Commission for Immigration Reform and Control believed allowing rionim-
migrants to adjust their status would encourage fraudulent entry, the majority 
of members acknowledged the substantial benefits of admitting and adjusting 
the status of nonimmigrants and did not believe this would result in any abuse. 244 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The "known to the Government" phrase has become a vital aspect of proving 
eligibility for legalization to nonimmigrants. 245 Given the INS's narrow inter-
pretation, many nonimmigrants will be deported if they are unable to meet the 
stricter requirement of "known to the lNS."246 As shown in this Comment, there 
is an alternate interpretation that is plausible and persuasive. 
Although a reviewing court would owe deference to an INS factual finding, 
deference would not be due in the situation at hand. 247 Since the "known to the 
Government" issue centers around a legal question of pure statutory interpre-
tation which does not hinge on the expertise of the INS, a reviewing court 
would be in a better position to determine the legislature's intended meaning.248 
The district courts in both Farzad and Ayuda agreed with this view when they 
held that the "known to the Government" phrase should include all federal 
agencies, and that the INS interpretation was impermissibly narrow.249 Although 
these courts concurred in their opinions, and the INS has decided not to appeal 
either decision, the INS has not complied with the decisions and continues to 
recommend denial of "known to the Government" applicants. 25o 
Given the contrary interpretations of the INS and the district courts, this 
Comment considered the two interpretations according to traditional rules bf 
statutory interpretation. The plain meaning of "Government" as stated in sev-
eral dictionaries and case interpretations includes all federal agencies. 251 This, 
along with the context of the phrase within IRCA, where Congress has distin-
m See H.R. REP. No. 682, ,upra note 21, at 49; S. REP. No. 132, supra note 20, at 15. 
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grounds that "amnestv reward[s] law breakers." N. MONTWEILER, supra note 4, at 56-57. The McCullum 
bill was defeated by a seven vote margin. [d. 
"5 See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
240 fri. 
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'" !d. 
24'1 See supra notes I 07-56 and accompanying text. 
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'" See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text. 
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guished its intention between the INS and the Government in numerous other 
sections of the law, makes a very persuasive argument that the phrase should 
be defined to include all federal agencies of the federal government. 252 
To support its position, the INS has put emphasis on the word "known" in 
order to argue that it is the only competent body to "know" or determine if an 
alien is illegal.253 Although persuasive, this argument is not supported by the 
text of the statute or the legislative history, neither of which require a formal 
INS determination of illegality.254 
The final considerations of statutory interpretation, the legislative history and 
relevant policy concerns, prove that the most reasonable interpretation includes 
all federal agencies' information of illegal status.255 Although the legislative 
history does not specifically state an intention as to "known to the Government," 
Congress' overall intent was to enact a generous legalization program with 
flexible standards for eligibility.256 The basic purpose of the phrase is to avoid 
falsification of records.257 There is no valid reason why only the INS can provide 
authentic verification. 
In conclusion, it has been shown that the "known to the Government" phrase 
has the potential to affect a large number of nonimmigrant aliens who will be 
denied temporary residence because their status was not "known to the INS" 
before January 1, 1982. Interestingly, if their status had been known to the 
INS, there is a strong chance they would have been deported before the passage 
of IRCA.258 Overall, these aliens do not have a realistic chance for legalization 
if the INS continues to apply its own restrictive interpretation of the legalization 
requirement. 
252 See supra notes 171-97 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. 
254 I d.; see supra notes 198-217 and accom panying text. 
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